We study the equilibrium implications of a multi-asset economy in which asset managers are each subject to a different benchmark. We demonstrate how heterogeneous benchmarking endogenously generates a mechanism through which fundamental shocks propagate across assets. Asset managers' capital invested for benchmarking purposes enters the pricing kernel and fluctuations in this capital induce price pressure that can result in negative spillovers across asset returns. We study the equilibrium properties of benchmarking-induced negative spillovers by analyzing shock elasticities and cross-elasticities of price-dividend ratios and asset managers' market shares. Our results, which are obtained in closed-form, are also in line with the weakened correlation across industry-sector portfolios and investment styles over short horizons, and provide new testable implications on the established "asset-class" effect. An asset that is included in a benchmark may not only comove negatively with assets included in a different benchmark, but also with assets belonging to the same benchmark.
Introduction
A characteristic feature of the professional money management industry is that the performance of asset managers is measured relative to the performance of a designated benchmark. Within mutual fund families, for example, every asset manager is assigned a specific benchmark in accordance with her investment style. Moreover, in a bid to compete for investors, investment funds increasingly diversify their mandates and investment styles (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005) . Therefore, the benchmarks that are used to affect asset managers' incentives have become increasingly heterogeneous. In this paper, we take the presence of heterogeneous benchmarking as given and study the implications of such heterogeneity on equilibrium asset prices, with a particular focus on their comovements. To our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to analyze this form of heterogeneity in an equilibrium setting.
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model with two asset managers who, besides caring for their own performance, are each concerned with the performance of a different benchmark. We follow Basak and Pavlova (2013) and model benchmarking concerns by embedding them in the asset managers' objective functions. Our economy has one riskless bond and multiple risky assets, among which some are part of a benchmark and some are not. The bond is in zero net supply, while the risky assets are in positive net supply. We model each manager's benchmark as consisting of two risky assets: a common asset, that is part of both benchmarks, and a specialized asset, that is exclusive to a single benchmark. One interpretation of the specialized assets in our economy is that they represent different sector portfolios, or alternatively different investment styles, as in Barberis and Shleifer (2003) .
A major advantage of our framework is that it preserves analytical tractability and allows us to characterize the equilibrium quantities in closed-form. Our main goal is to understand how cashflow news propagates across risky assets when asset managers have heterogeneous benchmarks. In order to isolate the equilibrium effects due to heterogeneous benchmarking, we intentionally ignore aggregate shocks that would affect all assets. We demonstrate that heterogeneous benchmarking can lead to contagion of cashflow news across assets belonging to different benchmarks. Accordingly, we characterize a rich structure of asset price comovements that delivers new testable implications.
The equilibrium pricing kernel in our economy is driven not only by the aggregate dividend but also by the dividends associated with the two benchmarks. In particular, all our equilibrium quantities are determined by two key state variables, each capturing the capital one asset manager invests for benchmarking purposes, scaled by the size of the economy. We label these state variables "scaled benchmarking capital." Intuitively, the scaled benchmarking capital of a manager is driven by the benchmarking incentives of that manager and by her wealth share in the economy. Fluctuations in these components generate wealth transfers, which are ultimately responsible for the comovement of asset prices.
In order to examine the equilibrium asset return exposures to cashflow news, we develop a decomposition of these exposures in three parts: (i) a fundamental component; (ii) a component due to homogeneous benchmarking; and (iii) a component capturing the effects of heterogeneous benchmarking. The first two parts of this decomposition confirm the established results that cashflow news for an asset that is included in a benchmark is amplified, and spills over to all the other assets within its benchmark. The third component of our decomposition isolates the effects of the mechanism propagating cashflow news that is solely attributable to heterogeneous benchmarking.
We find that in the presence of heterogeneous benchmarking, cashflow news affecting the fundamentals of a specialized asset spills over to the asset returns of a specialized asset in a different benchmark. To fix ideas, this result implies that news about a telecom-stock in a telecom-sector benchmark, affects the returns of a utility-stock in a utility-sector benchmark. Importantly, this spillover effect does not rely on the benchmarks having overlapping assets. In particular, we uncover that heterogeneous benchmarking causes the return of a specialized asset to become negatively exposed to cashflow news about other specialized assets.
The intuition behind these results goes as follows. Benchmarking incentives create hedging motives that induce managers to increase their demand for assets in their benchmark. The hedging demand of one manager increases the prices of the assets in her benchmark, and when other managers are subject to different benchmarks, they effectively perceive these assets as "overvalued". This generates differences in the asset holdings of the two managers, which translates in heterogenous exposures to the underlying fundamental shocks in the economy. Intuitively, each manager increases the exposure towards her specialized asset and decreases the exposure towards the asset in which the other manager specializes. Therefore, as positive cashflow news regarding a specialized asset materializes, both the wealth share and the benchmarking incentives of the manager who is benchmarked against that asset increase, thus increasing the benchmarking capital (per unit of aggregate dividend) deployed by that manager in the economy. Since the benchmarking capital deployed by the other manger, instead, decreases, the initial fundamental shock results in a positive price pressure towards the benchmarked assets of the growing manager and a negative price pressure towards the benchmarked assets of the declining manager. This generates a negative comovement between the specialized assets of different benchmarks.
Following the same logic, a positive fundamental shock to a specialized asset triggers opposing price pressures towards assets that belong to both benchmarks. Indeed, while the growing manager desires to buy these assets, the declining manager desires to sell them. Although the dominating effect de-pends on the benchmarking capital of the two managers and on the relative degree of specialization of the benchmarks, the negative price pressure occurs only in the presence of heterogenous benchmarking. Therefore, we further establish that heterogenous benchmarking is also responsible for negative spillover effects between specialized and common assets, over and above what homogenous benchmarking predicts. These findings provide a refinement to the established "asset-class" effect (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; Boyer, 2011) that can be taken to the data.
Our ket result is an equilibrium characterization of negative asset comovements. Notably, negative comovements occur not only for assets across different benchmarks, but also for assets within the same benchmark. This is a consequence of the negative asset return exposures, which are uniquely induced by heterogeneous benchmarking. Negative asset return comovements across benchmarks are in line with weakened comovements across asset styles that Barberis and Shleifer (2003) obtain within a behavioral model. We, instead, derive our results in a fully rational setting in general equilibrium, in which managers care about their performance relative to designated benchmarks, capturing their investment styles. We further show that assets within the same benchmark can also become negatively correlated if the benchmark is sufficiently specialized towards its style.
To emphasize the economic relevance of the equilibrium effects of heterogenous benchmarking, we consider the ratio of shock elasticities, which captures the relative change of two endogenous quantities following the same exogenous shock. In particular, we construct cross-elasticities of equilibrium pricedividend ratios and the elasticity of price-dividend ratios with respect to a manager's market share. These elasticities are closer to what an empiricist may try to measure in the data, and in principle could be used to identify of our equilibrium mechanism in the data. We finally derive the equilibrium hedging portfolios of the two managers, expressed as fractions of their capital invested directly in the two benchmarks. Although each manager only cares about changes in fundamentals for assets within her benchmark, we show that she optimally hedges these changes by trading in both benchmarks.
Related Literature
Equilibrium implications of explicit and implicit incentives in the asset management industry are the focus of a growing literature. Our paper relates most closely to the strand of that literature that focuses on benchmarking incentives. Brennan (1993) considers for the first time a static setting in which equilibrium prices are determined by the presence of institutional investors with preferences depending on performance relative to a benchmark. He shows that equilibrium expected returns are given by a two-factor model, with the factors being the market portfolio and the benchmark. Basak and Pavlova (2013) also embed benchmarking concerns into the objective function of a single institutional investor.
They consider a dynamic setting, and allow for wealth effects to play a role in the determination of asset prices. In equilibrium, the institutional investor demands more of asset included in her benchmark, thus raising the prices of these assets and making them more volatile and more correlated with each other. By adopting a similar objective function for institutional investors, Schwenkler, Duarte and Lee (2015) study the systemic implications of benchmarking. The competitive pressure among institutions to beat the benchmark may expose retail investors to tail risk. Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) model explicit benchmarking incentives through delegation contracts, in a dynamic setting with two risky assets. A representative manager's fee is a piece-wise affine function of absolute return and of the return relative to a benchmark. The authors show that while the manager's demand always raises the prices of the assets included in the benchmark, the equilibrium effect on volatility depends on the convexity of the managers fee. Sotes-Paladino and Zapatero (2015) also consider convex incentives. They build on Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007) , and introduce asymmetric information between a representative asset manager and a retail investor, giving rise to misvaluation from the perspective of the asset manager. In equilibrium, large overvaluation is associated with the manager outperforming the benchmark, which in turn induces her to engage in indexing and forgo the opportunity to exploit the misvaluation. Buffa, Vayanos and Woolley (2014) study the joint determination of optimal asset management contracts and equilibrium prices. They show that benchmarking is part of an optimal contract in the presence of agency frictions, and can generate price implications that are in line with documented anomalies for the risk-return relationship and the pricing of the aggregate market. Cvitanić and Xing (2018) confirm the main asset pricing results in Buffa, Vayanos and Woolley (2014) by considering a general contractual space. Breugem and Buss (2016) consider the interaction between (exogenous) benchmarking and endogenous information choice and the implications for market efficiency. The authors find that when subject to benchmarking, institutional investors have lower incentives to acquire private information, which in equilibrium may reduce the informativeness of asset prices. In a related paper on delegated asset management with information acquisition, Sockin and Zhang (2017) show that benchmarking arises endogenously when fund managers face moral hazard in portfolio allocation decisions.
1
A common feature among these theoretical works is the focus on a representative institution. We complement the existing analyses by considering a model with multiple risky assets and multiple institutions that are subject to different exogenous benchmarks. Notwithstanding the multiplicity of assets and institutions, our setting remains tractable and allows us to investigate how the cross-section of asset price comovements is affected by heterogeneous benchmarking. Our theoretical framework, centered on the heterogeneous incentives of institutional investors, is in line with the empirical asset pricing model developed by Koijen and Yogo (2017) . The authors emphasize the importance of a rich heterogeneity in asset demand across institutional investors, which they estimate using institutional portfolio holdings.
Within a behavioral setting in which some investors use exogenously specified rules to move funds across investment styles, Barberis and Shleifer (2003) show that assets within the same style comove too much, whereas assets in different styles comove too little. Moreover, news about one investment style can affect the returns of assets in an unrelated style. Their model helps explain the asset-class effect that is documented in Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) , and Boyer (2011) . Our model of heterogeneous benchmarking provides a rational framework that microfounds the optimal demand for assets in different investment styles. Our results on negative spillovers are in line with the weakened comovements across investment styles, which other rational models of asset pricing, to our knowledge, are not able to generate without assuming an exogenous correlation structure of asset fundamentals.
2
Ehling and Heyerdahl-Larsen (2016) study time variation in stock market correlations in a general equilibrium model in which agents have heterogeneous preferences due to external habits. While their model generates time varying correlation due to changes in the aggregate risk aversion, asset price comovements are always positive. Our model of heterogeneous benchmarking, which instead captures a structural feature of the asset management industry, is also able to deliver negative price comovements. Our economic mechanism, based on wealth redistribution across institutional investors, shares some similarities with the mechanism in Rigobon (2007, 2008) , who study financial contagion and asset price dynamics across different countries in the presence of demand shocks and portfolio constraints.
3
Our institutional asset pricing model also complements the recent contributions in the intermediary asset pricing literature Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013) ; Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) ; Adrian, Etula and Muir (2014) ; He, Kelly and Manela (2017) ; Haddad and Muir (2018); Ma (2018) ). While these studies stress the importance of intermediary balance sheets, and specifically of fluctuations in equity capital ratios of financial intermediaries as drivers of asset prices, we emphasize the role of 2 More recent empirical work documenting different implications of the price impact of institutional investors includes Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) , Anton and Polk (2014) , Lines (2016), and Chen (2017) .
3 Seminal contributions on financial contagion through a wealth effect include Xiong (2001) and Kyle and Xiong (2001) . Other asset pricing models with heterogeneous agents, instead, include Dumas (1989) , Wang (1996) , Chan and Kogan (2002) , Bhamra and Uppal (2009), Xiong and Yan (2010) , Cvitanić, Jouini, Malamud and Napp (2011), Chabakauri (2013) , Rytchkov (2014) , Longstaff and Wang (2014) , Garleanu and Panageas (2015) , Chabakauri and Rytchkov (2016), and Illeditsch (2017) .
benchmarking capital of institutional investors as a further channel through which shocks affect the cross-section of asset returns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium pricing kernel, and obtain implications for the optimal risk exposure of asset managers and the equilibrium price-dividend ratios. Section 4 presents our main results on asset price comovements and the implications of negative spillovers. Section 5 concludes.
Economic Setting
In this section we lay out the structure of the model and introduce heterogeneous benchmarking. We consider a standard pure-exchange finite horizon economy, where time t is continuous and goes from zero to T . The financial market is complete and risk is characterized by an (N + 1)-dimensional Brownian motion Z = (Z 1 , .., Z N +1 ) , defined on the probability measure P.
Assets
There are N + 1 risky assets and a single riskless bond traded in the economy. The exogenous interest rate r paid by the riskless bond is set to zero. Risky asset k represents a claim on the terminal dividend D kT , payed at time T , which is determined by the process
for k = 1, .., N , where µ is a positive constant and σ D k is a vector with entry k equal to σ > 0 and all other entries equal to zero, implying independent asset fundamentals. We refer to changes in D kt as cashflow news about asset k, and we assume that D k0 > 0. To maintain a tractable setting, we follow the approach in Basak and Pavlova (2013) and in Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2004), by directly modeling the dynamics of the aggregate dividend
where η is a positive scalar and ν is a positive vector with equal entries equal toν > 0.
4
Each risky asset is in positive net supply of one share, and the price of asset k, denoted by S kt , has the posited dynamics
Since we denote with dR kt ≡ dS kt /S kt the (dollar) return of asset k at time t, µ S kt and σ S kt , which are endogenous quantities to be determined in equilibrium, represent the expected return of asset k at time t and its return exposure to shocks in the economy, respectively. A complete financial market, as the one described here, implies the existence of a unique stochastic discount factor (i.e., state price density process), denoted by ξ, with dynamics
where the vector θ t represents the (endogenous) market price of risk at time t.
Asset Managers
Our economy is populated with two asset management firms, whose performance is evaluated against a different designated benchmark, reflecting different investment styles. That asset managers care about their performance relative to a specific benchmark index is a salient feature of the professional money management industry. This can be due to the implicit incentives induced by fund flows (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998) , or by the explicit bonus incentives which depend on the relative performance of the fund (e.g., Ma, Tang, and Gomez, 2018) . A second important feature is that asset managers care more to beat their benchmark when the benchmark is high than when it is low.
We model these key features in reduced form following Basak and Pavlova (2013) , and specify that each asset manager i's preferences are characterized by an increasing marginal utility in the level of its own benchmark. Formally, we adopt the following objective function, defined over the terminal wealth W iT ,
where
T represents the terminal value of manager i's benchmark, and the constant b i > 0 captures the importance of benchmarking for manager i.
5 When b i = 0, benchmarking concerns are absent and the objective function of manager i becomes a traditional log-utility. Given the dynamics in (3), the evolution of asset manager i's wealth is given by
where π
is a vector of portfolio weights (i.e., fractions of wealth) invested in each asset, µ 
Benchmarking
The different investment styles of asset managers are reflected in the composition of their benchmarks. In particular, despite sharing some common assets, what makes benchmarks heterogeneous is that they also include specialized assets that are not included in other benchmarks. For example, the specialized assets of one benchmark may be growth stocks, while for another benchmark these may be value stocks, or alternatively, benchmarks may be specialized in different industries.
In what follows, we take benchmark heterogeneity as given, and characterize the assets in our economy by their inclusion in the two benchmarks. Accordingly, we define four asset classes out of the first N assets, each one corresponding to a different combination of benchmark inclusion: assets that are only included in the benchmark of manager 1; assets that are only included in the benchmark of manager 2; assets that are included in the benchmarks of both managers; and assets that are in neither benchmark. Since within each of these asset classes, every asset would exhibit the same equilibrium properties, we consider a representative asset of for each of the four asset classes (N = 4). Therefore, in the remainder of the paper, asset 1 denotes the specialized asset in benchmark 1, asset 2 denotes the specialized asset in benchmark 2, asset 3 denotes the common asset across both benchmarks, and asset 4 denotes the asset that is not benchmarked by either manager.
A further layer of heterogeneity may arise from the degree of specialization, which is the relative weight a benchmark places on its specialized assets relative to the common assets. Accordingly, we define the terminal value of each benchmark I iT in our economy as a geometric weighted average of the form of an asset manager's objective function. Hong, Jiang, Wang and Zhao (2014) adopts a similar formulation of the objective function as in Basak and Pavlova (2013) to capture status-based incentives.
its specialized asset i (for i = 1, 2) and the common asset 3, with weights given by α i , and 1 − α i , respectively:
In what follows, the vector χ i denotes the vector of benchmark weights in all the risky assets in the economy. Specifically, χ 1 has positive weights only in asset 1 and 3, χ 1 = (α 1 , 0, 1 − α 1 , 0, 0) , whereas χ 2 has positive weights only in asset 2 and 3, χ 2 = (0, α 2 , 1 − α 2 , 0, 0) . A simple application of Itô's lemma gives us the dynamics of cashflow news associated with benchmark i,
Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Benchmarking
In this section we present the equilibrium asset prices in the presence of heterogeneous benchmarking and discuss their determinants, along with the managers' optimal exposure to the shocks in the economy. The discussion of the equilibrium in this section lays the ground for the analysis of asset price comovements in the next section.
The equilibrium concept in our economy is standard. Asset prices and portfolio choices form an equilibrium if: (i) given prices, portfolio choices maximize the expected value of (5) subject to the dynamic budget constraint in (6); (ii) given portfolio choices, markets clear (W 1T + W 2T = D T ). The next proposition provides an explicit formulation for the stochastic discount factor in this economy.
Proposition 1 (Stochastic Discount Factor). The equilibrium stochastic discount factor at time t is equal to 
The plots are typical.
Consequently, the equilibrium market price of risk at time t, characterizing the volatility of the process dξ t in (4), is given by
for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 1 reveals that the stochastic discount factor in this economy is driven by the aggregate dividend D t -as in any frictionless asset pricing model -as well as by the dividends associated with the two benchmarks I 1t and I 2t . While high values of D t (positive cashflow news for the aggregate dividends) reduce the level of the stochastic discount factor, high values of I it (positive cashflow news for benchmark i) increase it. This implies that, opposite to the aggregate dividend, high values of I it characterize bad states of the world in equilibrium. This is because high values of I it imply a higher risk for manager i of underperforming relative to her benchmark, which is in turn reflected in a higher marginal utility. As a consequence, cashflow news regarding a benchmarked asset has competing effects on the stochastic discount factor, making it non-monotonic in its respect. When benchmarking concerns are absent, instead, only the aggregate dividend is relevant for pricing risky claims, and the stochastic discount factor is monotonically decreasing in each individual asset's cashflow news. We illustrate these findings in Figure 1 by plotting the stochastic discount factors for different cashflow news regarding the three benchmarked assets. The solid line in the three panels depicts the case in which benchmarking concerns are present (b 1 > 0, b 2 > 0), the dashed line the case in which they are absent (b 1 = b 2 = 0).
Proposition 1 also unveils how the two benchmarks in the economy impact the equilibrium market price of risk θ t . In particular, the equilibrium quantity κ it affects the sensitivity of the market price of risk to the exposure of benchmark i to cashflow news, σ I i . Since κ it is always positive, the inclusion of an asset in one or both benchmarks reduces the price of risk of that asset. The intuition underlying the reduced price of risk is that the managers "like" to load on their benchmarks due to their benchmarking concerns (b i > 0), and therefore, in equilibrium, "demand" less compensation for the risk associated with the benchmarked assets. Therefore, in equilibrium, benchmarked assets will have a lower market price of risk than any assets with the same fundamentals which are not included in any benchmarks:
The intuitive formulation of the market price of risk allows us to analyze how cashflow news propagates to the wealth of asset managers. In the next proposition, we characterize their equilibrium risk exposures σ
Proposition 2 (Manager's Risk Exposure). The equilibrium risk exposure at time t of asset manager i is given by the vector
for j = i = 1, 2. Consequently, compared to her exposure to an un-benchmarked asset, in equilibrium an asset manager always increases her exposure to the asset she specializes in, and always decreases her exposure to the asset in which the other manager specializes.
For a given set of asset prices, or prices of risk θ t , the optimal risk exposure of asset manager i to cashflow news in the economy is equal to
represents the risk exposure of manager i, per unit of wealth, which is induced by benchmarking. We refer to H it as the hedging exposure to benchmark i. Intuitively, in order to hedge against fluctuations in its value, manager i finds it optimal to increase the exposure to cashflow news affecting her benchmark. In particular, H it α i captures the additional risk exposure to specialized asset i and H it (1 − α i ) the additional risk exposure to the common asset 3. In partial equilibrium, therefore, the risk exposure of manager i is affected only by benchmark i, and not by the other benchmark in the economy.
In general equilibrium, however, the risk exposure of manager i becomes dependent on benchmark j through the endogenous market price of risk θ t . Substituting (10) into (13), we obtain (12). The equilibrium risk exposure of manager i provides valuable insights for the underlying equilibrium mechanism. First, the higher demand for assets in benchmark i, due to relative performance incentives of manager i, pushes their prices of risk down by κ it σ I i , thus making them less desirable to hold and ensuring market clearing. As a result, the total risk exposure of manager i to assets in benchmark i reduces precisely by the amount κ it σ I i , but remains always positive because of the dominant effect of his hedging exposure (i.e., H it − κ it is always positive). Second, the higher demand for assets in benchmark j, due to relative performance incentives of manager j, pushes their prices of risk down by κ it σ I j , thus reducing the compensation for bearing the risk associated with those assets. As a result, in equilibrium manager i reduces her risk exposure to the assets in benchmark j by the amount κ jt σ I j . Suppose, for instance, that benchmark 2 receives positive cashflow news. Given her benchmark-induced incentives, asset manager 2 desires to increase her exposure to assets in benchmark 2. In equilibrium, such desire of asset manager 2 is "satisfied" by asset manager 1, who is induced by market prices to reduce her exposure in benchmark 2.
A key equilibrium quantity in our economy is κ it . As discussed so far, κ 1t and κ 2t affect the market price of risk θ t and consequently a manager's optimal risk exposure σ W i t . A useful interpretation of the quantity κ it is that it captures the equilibrium dollar amount invested towards benchmarking purposes, scaled by the "size" of the economy. Henceforth, we refer to κ it as the scaled benchmarking capital of manager i at time t, and we provide a formal representation for it in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 (Scaled Benchmarking Capital). The equilibrium scaled benchmarking capital of asset manager i at time t is positively related to her hedging exposure H it and to her wealth share W it /D t :
where τ (t) = e (||ν|| 2 −η−νσ)(T −t) is a positive deterministic function.
Lemma 1 shows that a manager's scaled benchmarking capital depends on her benchmarking incentives, through the optimal hedging exposure H it , and on her relative wealth in the economy. Intuitively, the former reflects the desire of a manager to hedge fluctuations in her benchmark, and the latter the extent to which she can do so. A feature of κ it is that it depends positively on cashflow news regarding benchmark i. This is because both her hedging exposure and her wealth share increase with positive cashflow news to her benchmark. Perhaps a more intriguing feature of κ it , as it emphasizes the equilibrium nature of a manager's scaled benchmarking capital, is that it is negatively related to cashflow news regarding the specialized asset in benchmark j. The channel through which this occurs is a decrease in the wealth share of manager i rather than a change in her hedging exposure, given that specialized asset j is not included in benchmark i. The dependence of κ it on D jt through the equilibrium wealth distribution across asset managers in the economy plays an important role in the propagation of shocks across assets, which we explore in detail in the next section.
We conclude this section by analyzing the pricing of financial assets in the economy. The valuation of any asset traded in the economy can be computed as the discounted value of the future cashflow payed by the asset at time T , discounted using the equilibrium stochastic discount factor:
The equilibrium price of a risky asset is equal to the expected dividend of that asset, plus a premium or discount depending on whether its terminal dividend covaries positively or negatively with the stochastic discount factor. Absent benchmarking concerns (b 1 = b 2 = 0), only the aggregate dividend enters the pricing kernel, and it affects it negatively, ξ t = D −1 t e (||ν|| 2 −η)(T −t) . Since the terminal dividend of an asset contributes positively to the aggregate dividend, it follows that the sign of the covariance in (16) is negative in this special case. When, instead, benchmarking concerns are present, the terminal dividend of an asset may affect the pricing kernel positively through I iT , if that asset is included in any benchmark. The next proposition explicitly characterizes the equilibrium asset prices when asset managers are subject to heterogeneous benchmarking. In particular, we express the valuation of asset k at time t in terms of its price-dividend ratio S kt /D kt , denoted by V kt hereafter.
Proposition 3 (Price-dividend Ratio). The equilibrium price-dividend ratios at time t of the assets included in the benchmarks are equal to
for i = 1, 2, where V 4t = e (µ−νσ)(T −t) is the price-dividend ratio of the asset not included in any benchmark, and f x (t) = e xσ 2 (T −t) − 1 is a positive deterministic function which is monotonically increasing in
x. Consequently, an asset included in a benchmark exhibits in equilibrium a higher price-dividend ratio than an asset not included in any benchmark.
In line with recent results in the literature (e.g., Cuoco and Kaniel, 2011; Basak and Pavlova, 2013; Buffa, Vayanos and Woolley, 2014; Sotes-Paladino and Zapatero, 2015) , we find that benchmarking increases the prices of assets that are included in a benchmark, as compared to assets that are not. The intuition is that benchmarking concerns prompt asset managers to increase their demand for the assets that are included in their designated benchmark. To offset this increased demand, equilibrium prices for benchmarked assets go up, thus enabling market clearing.
More specifically, Proposition 3 shows that the percentage increase in the price-dividend ratio of an asset due to benchmarking incentives increases (i) with the importance of that asset in a benchmark (through its benchmark weight α i or 1 − α i ), and (ii) with the importance of that benchmark in the economy (through the equilibrium scaled benchmarking capital κ it ). Accordingly, the pricing equations in (17) reveal that while the valuation of specialized assets 1 and 2 is affected by the scaled benchmarking capital of only the corresponding asset manager, the valuation of the common asset 3 is affected by the scaled benchmarking capital of both managers. Figure 2 highlights the effect of (ii) by plotting the pricedividend ratio of benchmarked assets, normalized by the price-dividend ratio of the un-benchmarked asset, for different cashflow news D kt affecting the equilibrium scaled benchmarking capitals (κ 1t , κ 2t ).
The desire of an asset manager to hedge against fluctuations in the cashflow news regarding her benchmark increases the prices of the assets in that benchmark, thus making these assets "overvalued" from the perspective of the other manager. For instance, from the perspective of manager 1, assets outside her benchmark (asset 2 and asset 4) should have the same price-dividend ratio. However, because asset 2 belongs to the benchmark of manager 2, its price-dividend ratio is higher in equilibrium, as (17) reveals. This relative overvaluation is key for the understanding of the economic mechanism responsible for the comovement of asset prices. 
Asset Price Comovements
In this section we formally study the equilibrium implications for asset price comovements. We demonstrate how heterogeneous benchmarking endogenously generates a mechanism through which fundamental shocks propagate across assets. A notable finding is that, despite independent asset fundamentals, heterogeneous benchmarking may give rise to negative return spillovers, causing price-dividend ratios (and asset returns) to comove negatively. In particular, an asset that is included in a benchmark can not only comove negatively with assets included in a different benchmark, but also with assets belonging to the same benchmark. To highlight the economic significance of the mechanism at play, we conclude this section by discussing which economic quantities (potentially measurable in the data) we expect to be mostly affected by the negative spillovers.
Dynamics of Scaled Benchmarking Capital
Before presenting our findings on the equilibrium dynamics of asset prices, it is worth discussing some properties pertaining the dynamics of asset managers' scaled benchmarking capitals. The following Lemma presents the condition under which the scaled benchmarking capital increases or decreases with cashflow news in the economy.
Lemma 2 (Fluctuations in Scaled Benchmarking Capital). The percentage change of manager i's scaled benchmarking capital at time t, dκ it /κ it , has an equilibrium exposure to cashflow news
for j = i = 1, 2. Consequently, a manager's scaled benchmarking capital is (i) positively exposed to cashflow news regarding the asset she specializes in, σ
(ii) negatively exposed to cashflow news regarding the asset in which the other manager specializes, σ κ i t (j) < 0; (iii) positively exposed to cashflow news regarding the common asset, σ
, which is always satisfied when α i α j .
As anticipated in the previous section, wealth re-distributions and changes in benchmarking incentives are the two determinants affecting the scaled benchmarking capitals of the asset managers in the economy. Lemma 2 formally shows how changes in asset fundamentals propagate to the scaled benchmarking capitals. In order to emphasize and better understand the two channels through which this happens, we consider the following alternative and, perhaps, more intuitive formulation of σ κ i t :
% change in benchmarking incentives
The first term on the right-hand side of (19) reveals that any positive cashflow news (weakly) increases the benchmarking incentives of a manger since (1−H it ) > 0 and σ I i 0. For instance, positive cashflow news regarding specialized asset 1 increases the benchmarking incentives of manager 1 and it leaves those of manager 2 unaltered. Therefore, positive cashflow news cannot propagate negatively to any manager's scaled benchmarking capital through changes in their benchmarking incentives. However, positive cashflow news can propagate negatively to a manager's scaled benchmarking capital through a reduction in that manager's wealth share. In fact, this occurs whenever a specialized asset receives a positive cashflow news. For instance, positive cashflow news regarding specialized asset 1 always decreases the wealth share of manager 2. The intuition, as discussed in the context of Proposition 2, is that in equilibrium manager 2 finds it optimal to reduce her exposure to specialized asset 1, due to the over-valuation induced by manager 1 (and hence the reduced compensation for the risk to hold this asset). As a consequence, the wealth of manager 2 grows less than the the aggregate dividend (i.e., the growth in the economy), and this makes her wealth share go down. Lemma 2 also reveals that, if the benchmark of a manager is sufficiently specialized (relative to the other benchmark), the wealth share of that manager can also decrease following a positive cashflow news regarding the common asset.
The key feature of an economy with heterogenous benchmarking is that it generates wealth transfers across the asset managers (i.e., the marginal agents) in the economy, thus inducing fluctuations in their (scaled) benchmarking capitals. These fluctuations trigger price pressures that can result in negative spillovers across asset returns, as analyzed next.
Dynamics of Asset Returns
In Proposition 3 we show that the only state variables affecting the price-dividend ratios of benchmarked assets in the economy are the mangers' scaled benchmarking capitals. The dynamics of asset return are therefore driven by fluctuations in these capitals. The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium asset return exposures to cashflow news.
Proposition 4 (Return Exposure). The equilibrium return exposures to cashflow news at time t for the assets included in the benchmarks are equal to
The return exposure of the asset not included in the benchmarks σ S 4t is equal to σ D 4 . Consequently, heterogeneous benchmarking (σ I j = σ I i and σ I j = 0) makes any positive cashflow news propagate negatively across benchmarked assets. In particular, while positive cashflow news regarding a specialized asset reduces the return of the other specialized asset and of the common asset, positive cashflow news regarding the common asset reduces the return of all the benchmarked assets.
In a standard economy in which asset managers are not subject to benchmarking, the return of a risky asset is only exposed to its own cashflow news. In an economy in which asset managers are all subject to the same benchmark, instead, the return of a risky asset that is included in the benchmark becomes positively exposed to cashflow news concerning all the risky assets included in the benchmark. This generates a so-called "asset-class" effect (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 2005; Boyer, 2011) . Proposition 4 reveals that when asset managers are each subject to a different benchmark, the return of a specialized asset, which is only included in one of the two benchmarks, becomes exposed to cashflow news concerning the specialized asset of the other benchmark. Indeed, besides depending on σ I i , the return exposure σ S it is also a function of σ I j when the two benchmarks are heterogeneous. Therefore, heterogeneous benchmarking leads to contagion of cashflow news across assets belonging to different benchmarks.
Our analytical characterization of the asset return exposures allows for an explicit decomposition in three parts: (i) a fundamental component; (ii) a component due to the presence of benchmarking; and (iii) a component capturing the additional effects induced by heterogeneous benchmarking. We illustrate this decomposition by means of the following three-matrix representation: All three matrices are populated with plusses, minuses, or zeros, representing the signs of the effect of cashflow news about an asset (columns) on the return of all other assets (rows): the entry in position (k, ) indicates the effect of cashflow news regarding asset on the return of asset k. The first matrix then isolates the fundamental component of the return exposures, the second matrix isolates the component due to (homogeneous) benchmarking, and the last matrix singles out the component capturing the effects of heterogeneous benchmarking. The sum of three matrices yields the total asset return exposures.
To present the intuition behind the different effects in (23), let us consider positive cashflow news for asset 1 by focusing on the first column of each of the three matrices. To reflect the positive change in asset 1's fundamentals, the price of asset 1 adjusts upward. This explains the "+" sign in position (1,1) of the first matrix. The second matrix, instead, shows that the presence of benchmark 1 in the economy amplifies the fundamental price increase in asset 1 and triggers a price increase in asset 3. The intuition is as follows. Since asset 1 belongs to benchmark 1, positive news to asset 1's fundamentals translates into an increase in the cashflow news associated with benchmark 1. This in turn increases manager 1's wealth share (her exposure to asset 1,ν + (H 1t − κ 1t )α 1 , is above the corresponding exposure of the aggregate dividend,ν), and increases her desire to be exposed to the risky assets included in her benchmark (H it increases). In an attempt not to fall behind her benchmark, and as a reflection of the raise in her scaled benchmarking capital, manager 1 increases her exposure to both assets in her benchmark (asset 1 and asset 3), proportionally to their relative benchmark weights (α 1 and 1 − α 1 ). In equilibrium, the associated positive price pressure in both assets included in benchmark 1 is captured by the "+" signs in position (1,1) and (3,1) of the second matrix. This confirms the findings in Basak and Pavlova (2014) , where only one benchmarked asset manager is present in the economy.
How does the presence of manager 2 in the economy affect asset prices in equilibrium? Remember that, because of her hedging demand, manager 1 makes the specialized asset in her benchmark (asset 1) "overvalued" from the perspective of manager 2. For this reason, manager 2 has a reduced exposure to asset 1 in equilibrium. Going back to the positive cashflow news regarding asset 1, following such news the wealth share of manager 2 decreases (her exposure to asset 1,ν − κ 1t α 1 , is below the corresponding exposure of the aggregate dividend,ν) while her benchmarking incentives remain unchanged (H 2t is not affected by asset 1's fundamentals). Overall, this reduces manager 2's scaled benchmarking capital, thus triggering a negative price pressure to all the assets in her benchmark, and hence driving the prices of asset 2 and asset 3 down. This explains the "−" signs in position (2,1) and (3,1) of the third matrix.
Since a symmetric economic intuition is behind the signs populating the second column of the three matrices in (23), we proceed to discuss the changes in asset returns following positive news to the common asset's fundamentals. Because this asset is, by definition, included in both benchmarks, both managers' benchmarking incentives increase. However, this is not necessarily the case for their wealth shares, which instead may increase as well as decrease. In particular, there are two contrasting forces driving the dynamics of wealth shares when benchmarks are heterogeneous. On one hand benchmarking incentives induce a manger to increase her exposure to asset 3 above the corresponding exposure of the aggregate dividend (by (H it − κ it )(1 − α i )), on the other hand the "overvaluation" caused by the other manager induces her to decrease her exposure to asset 3 below that of the aggregate dividend (by −κ jt (1 − α j )). Importantly, absent heterogenous benchmarking the latter force is absent, hence a manager's scaled benchmarking capital always increases and prompts a positive price pressure towards the benchmarked assets. This explains the "+" signs in positions (1,3), (2,3) and (3,3) of the second matrix. Heterogeneous benchmarking, therefore, introduces a negative price pressure due to the "overvaluation" (through a reduction in the equilibrium price of risk θ t ) that the two managers impose on each other because of their heterogeneous benchmarking incentives. Isolating these effects alone, it is as if each manager sells all the assets included in her benchmark, thus driving their prices down. Accordingly, positions (1,3), (2,3) and (3,3) of the third matrix feature a "−" sign.
In sum, heterogeneous benchmarking is responsible for asset contagion and negative spillovers of fundamental shocks across risky assets that make up benchmarks. This novel mechanism provides a rich set of implications on asset price elasticities, correlations, and hedging portfolios, which we present and discuss in what follows.
Implications of Negative Spillovers
Elasticities. Following Borovička, Hansen and Scheinkman (2014), we consider shock elasticities of relevant equilibrium quantities as counterparts to impulse response functions characterizing the behavior of dynamical systems. In particular, we define the shock elasticity at time t of an equilibrium quantity X at time s as the time t expectation of the Malliavin derivative D t of X s , normalized by the time t expectation of X s :
In what follows we focus our attention on instantaneous reactions of equilibrium quantities to shocks (i.e., cashflow news) in the economy. Accordingly, we consider the instantaneous shock elasticity of X at time t, defined as
where σ X t is the diffusion term of dX.
7
To emphasize the economic relevance of the equilibrium effects of heterogenous benchmarking, we consider the ratio of shock elasticities of key equilibrium quantities in our model. The ratio of shock elasticities, which captures the relative change of two endogenous quantities following the same exogenous shock, is closer to what an empiricist may try to measure in the data. Importantly, one should be careful in interpreting these elasticities as causal relations, as both the numerator and the denominator of an elasticity are endogenous, and hence simultaneously determining each other. Therefore, here we simply want to consider some measures that could potentially help the identification of our equilibrium mechanism in the data.
7 When X follows the diffusion process dX t = µ X t dt + σ X t dZ t , the Malliavin derivative D t X s satisfies
We consider two sets of equilibrium quantities and, based on them, we construct two types of elasticity. The equilibrium quantities of interest are price-dividend ratios V kt and asset managers' market share s t ≡ W it /(W 1t + W 2t ). We consider the following questions:
• By how much does the price-dividend ratio of an asset change if the price-dividend ratio of another asset increases by 1% following a positive news to its fundamental? We address this question by constructing price-dividend cross-elasticities defined as E
• By how much does the price-dividend ratio of an asset change if the market share of manager 1 increases by 1% following a cashflow news regarding one of the benchmarked assets? We address this question by constructing market share elasticities of price-dividend ratios defined as E
We plot in figure Figure 3 the equilibrium elasticities as a function of the benchmarking incentives of manager 2, b 2 . The graphs in the top panels suggest that the negative spillovers induced by heterogeneous benchmarking should manifest in an economically significant negative price-dividend cross-correlation between specialized assets that belongs to different benchmarks (left and center panels). These spillovers may also manifest in a negative price-dividend cross-correlation between common assets an specialized assets that belong to the most specialized benchmark, especially following positive fundamental news regarding common assets (left panel). In line with these findings, the graphs in the bottom panels suggest that the negative spillovers should also be reflected in the market share elasticities. Correlations. We next analyze the correlation between valuation ratios that are implied by the equilibrium return exposures. We define the (instantaneous) correlation between the price-dividend ratios of asset k and asset at time t as
, and we present our key findings on asset correlation in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 (Price-dividend Correlation). Suppose benchmark 2 is more specialized than benchmark 1, α 2 α 1 . It follows that the price-dividend correlation between specialized asset 1 and the common asset is always positive, ρ V t (1, 3) 0. Moreover,
• the price-dividend correlation between the two specialized assets is negative, ρ V t (1, 2) 0 if the scaled benchmarking capitals in the economy are sufficiently high,
• the price-dividend correlation between specialized asset 2 and the common asset is negative, ρ V t (2, 3) 0, if the scaled benchmarking capital of manager 2 is sufficiently high, κ 2t >κ 2t .
Notwithstanding its simplicity, our setting yields a broad set of implications for asset comovements; not just for assets within the same benchmark, but also for assets across benchmarks. In particular, our analysis of asset correlation across benchmarks would not be possible in a setting with homogeneous benchmarking, where only within benchmark comovements can be studied. We show that our key result that asset returns can comove negative in equilibrium may translate in a negative correlation between price-dividend ratios (and asset returns). Notably, negative asset correlation occurs not only across benchmarks, but also within benchmarks. This is a consequence of the negative return exposures, which, as we discussed above, only arise in the presence of heterogeneous benchmarking. To guide our examination of asset correlation within and across benchmarks, Figure 4 presents the pairwise correlations in our economy as a function of the benchmarking incentives of manager 2, b 2 .
Negative asset return comovements across benchmarks are in line with weakened comovements across asset styles that Barberis and Shleifer (2003) obtain. In their behavioral model, investors move funds across investment styles, chasing performance based on exogenous rules. We, instead, derive our re- sults in a fully rational equilibrium model in which managers care about their performance relative to designated benchmarks, capturing their investment styles.
Hedging Portfolios. Given the optimal risk exposure of manager i in (13), her optimal portfolio π
This implies that the optimal portfolio of manager i can be decomposed into two components: a MeanVariance portfolio π
, and a hedging portfolio π
In the next Proposition we explicitly characterized the asset managers' hedging portfolios and we show that the construction of these portfolios entails trading in both benchmarks.
Proposition 6 (Hedging Portfolio). The equilibrium hedging portfolio of manager i can be represented as a dynamically rebalanced portfolio of the two benchmarks in the economy, with optimal weights (fractions of wealth) at time t given by
, π
for i = j ∈ {1, 2}, where σ S I i t (k) is characterized in the Appendix and represents the k-th element of the return exposure of benchmark i, σ S I i t . Consequently, in order to hedge against fluctuations in the cashflow news associated with benchmark i, manager i must also trade benchmark j: π
the return of benchmarks i is negatively exposed to cashflow news regarding the specialized asset j, σ S I i t (j) < 0, and manager i buys benchmark j, π
Proposition 6 reveals that in order to hedge against fluctuations in the cashflow news associated with benchmark cannot be achieve by trading only in that benchmark. In fact, a manager need to trade in both benchmark to achieve her desired hedging exposure. The intuition is that the equilibrium properties of asset prices naturally spill over to the market price of the two benchmarks. For instance, by buying benchmark 1, manger 1 exposes her hedging portfolio not only to cashflow news regarding asset 1 and asset 3 (the only two asset included in benchmark 1), but also to cashflow news regarding asset 2. This is because the equilibrium prices of asset 1 and asset 3 are sensitive to fundamental shocks in asset 2, through the endogenous fluctuations in the scaled benchmarking capital of the two managers in the economy. Therefore, in order to be exposed only to the fundamentals of asset 1 and asset 3 (which is the optimal hedging exposure for manger 1), manager 1 needs to "remove" the impact of a fundamental shock in asset 2 from her hedging portfolio. A way to achieve this is to trade in the other benchmark. In particular, if benchmark 1 is negatively exposed to cashflow news regarding asset 2, then the optimal trade is to buy benchmark 2, which is instead positively exposed to that news.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study and explicitly characterize the equilibrium implications of heterogeneous benchmarking. We consider an economy in which asset managers are each subject to a different benchmark, and solve for equilibrium asset prices and their properties. Our framework is tractable and allows us to characterize the equilibrium quantities in closed-form.
Our analysis demonstrates that heterogeneous benchmarking can lead to contagion of cashflow news across assets belonging to different benchmarks. Accordingly, we characterize a rich structure of asset price comovements that delivers new testable implications. Despite independent asset fundamentals, heterogeneous benchmarking may give rise to negative prince-dividend (and asset return) correlation. We show that an asset that is included in a benchmark can not only be negatively correlated with assets included in a different benchmark, but also with assets belonging to the same benchmark. Negative asset return comovements across benchmarks are in line with documented weakened comovements across investment styles. More broadly, out theory highlight the importance of the endogenous fluctuations in asset managers' investment capital which are driven by benchmarking incentives.
Proof of Proposition 1. In what follows we solve for the equilibrium stochastic discount factor and market price of risk for a generic number of assets N and asset managers M .
As markets are dynamically complete in our economy, we can solve the dynamic optimization problem of each asset manager using the martingale method (Karatzas, Lehoczky and Shreve, 1987; Cox and Huang, 1989) . This allows us to equivalently define the set of feasible policies π it in terms of the horizon wealth W iT subject to the static budget constraint
where, S m0 is initial value of the aggregate asset market, S m0 = N +1 k=1 S k0 , and ξ T is the state price density (stochastic discount factor) at time T . Therefore, manager i chooses W iT to maximize the expected value of (5) subject to (A.1). This yields the following constrained optimization problem
where y i is the Lagrange multiplier on the static budget constraint, and S A.6) where A i ≡ λ i /(1 + b i I i0 e µ I i T ). Since we normalize the riskfree rate to 0, the SDF ξ t is a martingale under the probability measure P, ξ t = E t [ξ T ], implying that
(A.7)
Since D T and I iT are GBM under P, both D where S m0 is such that ξ 0 = 1, as we verify later.
Before computing the equilibrium market price of risk θ t , we make use of the following notation, z t ≡ S m0 e (||ν|| 2 −η)(T −t) , (A.13) w it ≡ A i b i I it e (µ I i −ν σ I i )(T−t) , (A.14)
so that the SDF ξ t in (A.12) can be written as
Applying Ito's Lemma on ξ t in (A.15), we obtain the following dynamics
w it σ We finally obtain (10) and (11) by defining κ it as .19) by expressing σ I i as σχ i , and by setting M = 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since ξ t W it is a martingale under the probability measure P,
Applying Ito's Lemma to ξ t W it using the dynamics in (4) and (6) We obtain (12) by substituting θ t from (10) into (A.23), by expressing σ I i as σχ i , and by setting M = 2.
Proof of Lemma 1. TBC.
Proof of Proposition 3. The equilibrium price of asset k at time t is given by the discounted value of the cashflow at time T , D kT , discounted using the SDF in (A.12): and given (A.8) and (A.9), the following moments obtains: .26) 
